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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
In taking the requirement of malice to mean only intentional interference
without social or legal justification, New York has arrived at the Restatement
concept of the tort: ". . one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or
otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with
another, or (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable
to the other for the harm caused thereby."2' 1  Of course, where the contract is
terminable at will the law will not afford as much protection to the relation and
the range of privilege will be greater. In the present case the existence of the
relation described as confidential would preclude any privilege otherwise available
to defendant to induce plaintiff's employees to quit and come over to work for
him. An ordinary competitor would certainly be privileged to offer employees of
plaintiff better terms.-2 But here the relation between the parties was so incon-
sistent with competition as to eliminate such privilege. With its books open to
defendant, plaintiff's position would afford little chance to defend itself against
competition by defendant.
In determining whether a privilege exists to induce termination of at-will
contracts, it should be noted that there is no interest in the reliability and
stability of contracts, as such, to be protected. Perhaps for this reason, inducement
to breach a contract, and inducement to terminate according to the terms of the
contract, should be considered distinct torts. The interests in the present case
are, on the one side, the interest in free competition, and the interest of employees
in being able to obtain the best jobs available to them, and on the other side,
the interests in economic stability, in confidence in employment relations, in
confidence in manufacturer-distributor relations, and perhaps in the survival of
smaller business. In the dissent in this case, it was felt that the majority holding
entailed too drastic an interference with free competition and noted that
employers wishing to protect against such inducement of their employees could
obtain term employment contracts. However, in view of the desirability of
at-will employment and the special nature of the manufacturer-distributor relation,
the majority seems to have reached a proper result. If the Court has extended the
tort-if-not-privileged approach, so as to render actionable any intentional inter-
ference with contractual relations-regardless of breach of the contract-if not
legally or socially privileged (in other words, if the court considers the inter-
ference undesirable), the law in this area has become more flexible if less predict-
able.
MacPherson v. Buick-Applicable To Real Property
In lnman v. Binghamton Housing Authority- ' the Court held upon the facts
21. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §766 (1939).
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §768 (1939).
23. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
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alleged that neither an injured plaintiff nor a defendant-owner who filed a third
party complaint would have a cause of action against the architects or builder of
the apartment house at which plaintiff was injured while residing as a tenant.
Plaintiff, a two year old child, fell off the porch of the apartment. There
was no protective railing around the porch and a door was constructed in such
a manner as to force a person off the porch if standing near its edge when opened.
The accident occurred six years after the apartment house had been completed
and turned over to defendant-owner.
Plaintiff's cause of action against the architects and builder as third-party
defendants states that they had created a "hazardous and extremely dangerous
condition." The doctrine of the MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.24 case, holding
a manufacturer liable for injuries arising out of the use of a defectively made
chattel which was inherently dangerous, has been extended to real property
structures. 25 However, the doctrine applies only to "latent defects" or "concealed
dangers."2'  Plaintiff's complaint does not allege such "latent defects" or
"concealed dangers,' nor do the facts suggest them. Thus the Court held that
the complaint against the architects and builder was defective and should be
dismissed.
2 7
The defendant-owner claimed a common-law right to indemnification from
the architects and builder. Plaintiff's complaint against defendant-owner alleged
that he was an active tortfeasor and under such circumstances he would not have
a right to compel indemnification. 23 A contract existed between the builder and
defendant-owner in which the builder agreed to indemnify the owner for
injuries "arising out of or in connection with the . . . work." The scope of the
words used in a contract should be limited by the intent of the parties as
determined by the particular facts of the case.29 Also, an agreement will not be
interpreted as indemnifying a person against an injury arising out of his own
negligence unless such intention is clearly shown.30 The Court held that there
was no such express agreement, and it would be unreasonable to think that the
24. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
25. Adams v. White Construction Co., 299 N.Y. 641, 87 N.E.2d 52 (1949).
26. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
27. The Court in the instant case does not make it clear but If the remote
user can not recover because the intermediate party has knowledge of the defect,
the Court has set dangerous precedent. The manufacturer or builder should be
liable in all instances where he has been negligent and where the defect Is latent
as to the user. The manufacturer should be relieved only when there are reason-
able grounds to expect the intermediate party will take proper precautions before
the chattel is passed on to the user or the premises occupied by the remote party.
28. Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Corp., 307 N.Y. 422, 121 N.E.2d 399
(1954).
29. Robertson v. Ongley Electric Co., 146 N.Y. 20, 40 N.E. 390 (1895).
30. Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35
(1936).
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parties intended the builder to be liable for an injury which did not arise out
of a defect in workmanship or material used.
Duty To Provide Safe Equipment
Section 240 (1) of the New York Labor Law provides that, "a person
employing or directing another to perform . . .painting.., of a building ...
shall furnish.., for the performance of such labor.., ladders ... so constructed
... as to give proper protection .... This statute imposes an absolute duty, the
breach of which renders the wrongdoer liable without regard to his care or
lack of it.3
The plaintiff in Klutz v. Citron,32 hired to paint defendant's home, was
provided with a ladder having a defective rung. Because the ladder was too
long, the plaintiff without defendant's permission, cut it into two parts and
used the section which possessed the weakened rung, from which he fell. The
majority of the Court (4-3) held that the plaintiff could not recover for he
did not meet his burden 33 of establishing that the employer or director failed
to provide him with a ladder which would afford proper protection. The
reasoning upon which this conclusion rested was that the injury resulted from an
entirely different defective ladder than the one provided by the homeowner.
The dissent cogently points out the confusion of the majority by stating
that, "the fact that plaintiff cut a piece from the ladder furnished by defendant
has nothing whatever to do with the case since that cutting was in no sense the
cause of or related to the accident." This is so because it was the defective rung
which was part of the ladder provided by the defendant, which was the cause
of the injury.
The Appellate Division.4 had reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant
because of an alleged error of the trial judge in his instruction to the jury that
it could find liability under section 240 only if it found that the defendant
supervised the doing of the work. Although the Court of Appeals evaded this
difficult issue by confusing another, it found it could not bypass the problem
completely. In passing, it stated that the plaintiff was not an employee, but an
independent contractor, and that there was no evidence that the defendant
directed the manner or method of painting his home but left it solely to the
judgment and experience of the plaintiff. In Koenig v. Patrick Construction
31. Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
32. 2 N.Y.2d 379, 161 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1957).
33. Johnson v. Johnson, 249 App. Div. 859, 292 N.Y.Supp. 921 (2d Dep't
1937).
34. 1 A.D.2d 828, 953, 148 N.Y.S.2d 367 (2d Dep't 1956).
